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MARSHALLIAN VS. WALRASIAN STABILITY 
IN AN EXPERIMENTAL MARKET* 
Charles R. Plott and Glen George 
The experiments discussed below are an attempt to examine concepts of 
stability as found in economic textbooks.' Two concepts of stability, which stem 
from two different concepts of market adjustment, seem to have dominated 
thinking. Whilst these two concepts are typically called Walras stability and 
Marshall stability, some controversy exists over the extent to which these two 
models represent their respective thinking.2 No doubt the current formal 
statements of the theories reflect an evolution of the ideas through the work of 
many theorists. The terminology is retained for convenience. Regardless of 
their origins, these two concepts lead to competing hypotheses about the 
conditions under which market instability will be observed so the subject is a 
natural one for experimental investigation. Furthermore, since this is the first 
experimental examination of the stability of equilibria, the strategy is to inquire 
about stability in the context of these two classical models and to avoid the 
temptation to attempt to extend them or integrate them with more modern 
theory. The old models have not been checked. They seem to be an appropriate 
place to start. 
The Walrasian model views price as changing in response to excess demand 
at that price. The Marshallian model views volume as adjusting in response to 
the difference between demand price and supply price at that volume. These 
two models hold different implications for general theories of disequilibrium 
and market adjustment, and they make different statements about the 
conditions under which markets will exhibit instability. If supply is negatively 
sloped and if demand cuts supply from above, then the equilibrium is 
Walrasian unstable and Marshallian stable. If supply is negatively sloped and 
if demand cuts supply from below, then the equilibrium is Walrasian stable and 
Marshallian unstable. In Fig. i the downward sloping supply function is the 
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged as well as support 
from the California Institute of Technology Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. 
This project was first assigned as a project in an experimental economics class. Stephen Pitts contributed 
significantly to the development of instructions and to finding parameters of the continuous model that 
yielded acceptable integer solutions. The comments of John Ledyard and Jeffrey Dubin influenced the 
experimental design and data analysis. Comments by Gary Becker and Eskander Alvi were useful in helping 
us understand the theories and the literature. Special thanks go to Jessica Goodfellow for her help as a 
research assistant. 
1 A standard treatment can be found in Henderson and Quandt, I980, p. I6o. 
2 See a good summary of the controversy in Takayama (I974). 
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Fig. i. Supply and demand curves (continuous). 
curve SS. Given the demand function D1 D1 D1, three equilibria exist excluding 
the boundaries. Points c and e are Walrasian unstable and Marshallian stable. 
Point d is Walrasian stable and Marshallian unstable. The vertical boundary 
contains an additional stable Walrasian (but not Marshallian) equilibrium and 
the horizontal boundary contains an additional stable Walrasian (but not 
Marshallian) equilibrium. If the demand function is D2D2D2, point c is 
Walrasian (Marshallian) stable (unstable) and point d is Walrasian (Marshal- 
lian) unstable (stable). Point e is no longer an equilibrium. The vertical axis 
contains a Marshallian (but not Walrasian) stable equilibrium and the 
horizontal axis contains a Walrasian (but not Marshallian) stable equilibrium. 
The curves in Fig. I are continuous approximations of the parameters 
actually used in the experimental markets. The markets first exist under 
conditions D1 and according to theory the emerging prices should be near to 
one of the stable equilibria. Presumably prices will converge only to the stable 
equilibria. If demand is shifted to D2 then prices and volume should move to 
one of the other equilibria because every stable equilibria under D1 is unstable 
under D2. This relationship among the equilibria is the key to the experiments 
reported in the paper. 
Two major problems present themselves to anyone who attempts to conduct 
experiments suggested by these stability concepts. The first and most difficult 
is determining a method for experimentally inducing a negatively sloped 
supply. The markets created for this study all have 'forward falling' as opposed 
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to 'backward bending' supply curves. The distinction is important because 
some believe that the nature of stability will change depending upon the 
conditions that generate the downward sloping supply. The decision to study 
the forward falling case reflects the existence of some fundamental limitations 
on the experimental methodology necessary for studying the backward 
bending case. The second problem involves a choice of market institutions. 
Three different market organisations are studied: the double auction, the 
sealed bid/offer, and the secant tatonnement.3 
Three basic questions are posed by the research. The first deals with the 
ability of the law of supply and demand to predict market behaviour. 
Downward sloping supply functions have not been studied experimentally so 
whether or not equilibration occurs is an open question. The forward falling 
case, which involves an externality, is especially problematic. The theory of 
market supply in this case is constructed from elements of a theory of consistent 
expectations. The question is: does the market demand and supply model 
predict price and volume? The second question is: does either concept of 
stability have predictive power? It is not obvious that these classical notions of 
stability, which originated by analogy to physical phenomena (Walras I,954 p. 
II2; Guillaband I96I, p. 346), as opposed to direct observations of markets, 
have any predictive power at all in a market context. The third question asks 
which stability concept is more appropriate. The fourth and final question is an 
inquiry about the sensitivity of answers to all of the above questions to market 
organisation. Certainly the usual description about Marshallian vs. Walrasian 
stability leans heavily on the existence of a price taking process such as 
tatonnement. Does the relevance of a stability concept depend upon how the 
market is organised? The examination of this question required the first study 
of a new class of tatonnement processes. 
A controversy exists in the literature motivated by the interpretation of 
original texts. Some feel that the Marshallian concept should apply only in the 
presence of production which takes time and that the Walrasian model is more 
appropriate for exchange. Production in the economic environment studied in 
this paper does not have any obvious time dimension so one might conjecture 
that Marshallian stability is less likely to be observed. In that sense one could 
consider the environment to be biased in favour of the Walrasian concept. 
Thus, if Walrasian stability had been observed, subsequent experiments would 
have focused on environments with production lags to isolate the boundaries of 
the model. Since Marshallian stability is observed, the results are strong 
because the Marshallian concept has been found operating under circumstances 
that a branch of theory suggests that it should not be. 
3 So many alternative organisations exist that the narrowing of the options to only three necessarily 
involved some subjective decisions and does not mean that the alternative forms should be neglected. These 
three were chosen because previous experiments with them exist and would be valuable in case the 
downward sloping supply induced substantially inexplicable behaviour. Some practical considerations 
existed as well. For example, posted prices have been studied considerably but posted prices are related to 
sealed bid auctions which are related to the sealed bid/offer process. 
17-2 
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Table I 
Redemption Value Table for Demanders 
Condition D1 Condition D2 
Agent Agent 
Unit I and 6 2 and 5 3 and 4 I and 6 2and 5 3 and 4 
I 960 88o 8oo 590 6Io 630 
2 6oo 640 720 570 530 530 
3 440 4Ic 4IO 480 5I0 5IO 
4 350 390 390 200 28o 320 
5 330 3I0 290 I20 40 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Fig. 2. Supply and demand curves (discrete). 
I. PARAMETERS 
The market demand and market supply functions based upon the actual 
parameters used in the experiment are shown in Fig. 2. Subjects were primarily 
inexperienced undergraduate students and graduate students from the 
California Institute of Technology. Preferences and costs were established by 
application of standard financial inducement techniques (see Plott (I982) or 
Smith (I982)). The actual instructions are included as an appendix. The 
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franc/dollar conversion rate was o04 cent per franc for demanders and I I cent 
per franc, I5 cent per franc and I5 cent per franc for the three types of sellers, 
respectively. After the first three experiments, which operated very slowly 
relative to the other experiments, the rates were 25 % less for buyers and 50 % 
less for sellers. The conversion rates were chosen to provide adequate incentives 
near the system equilibria. 
A. The Demand Curve 
Six agents were designated as demanders. These demanders were partitioned 
into two demanders of each of three types of agents. The redemption values are 
in Table i. Buyers were given two tables. One contained their marginal 
redemption values for all periods, and the other contained totals. 
Two different aggregate demands were used. These are labelled condition D1 
and condition D2 as shown in Fig. 2. In most experiments a shift of demand 
occurred in period Io. The first ten periods were under condition D1 and then 
the demand was shifted to D2. However, in some experiments conditions D1 
were maintained longer than ten periods to see if convergence to a theoretical 
equilibrium would become 'closer' with more periods under the same demand 
conditions. 
B. The Supply Curve 
The literature discusses three forms of negatively sloped supply. The 'backward 
bending' curve is usually associated with 'backward bending' individual 
supplies derived from negative income effects. The backward bending labour 
supplies are the typical example. The second form is the 'forward falling' 
supply curve associated with the existence of an externality. According to the 
forward falling concept, specialisation in resource functions and resource 
supplies has the effect of lowering costs as an industry grows. Competition is 
maintained in the forward falling case because individual firms have upward 
sloping marginal costs, given the volume of others. However, costs fall as the 
volume of others increases. Lowered costs are translated to lower prices through 
competition. The third form of negative sloped supply involves falling average 
cost at the individual firm level over the whole range of demand. This latter 
case theoretically results in monopoly. 
Our choice was to study the second form. The first, backward bending, 
necessitated the existence of at least two commodities. Conceptually, the 
appropriate two commodities could be created in a laboratory setting but 
practical problems associated with experimental methodology precluded an 
immediate examination of this case. The third form is interesting and has 
received some attention experimentally. The monopoly case, however, is not in 
the full spirit of the Marshallian vs. Walrasian stability issue. Our decision was 
to study the second 'forward falling' form. 
The forward falling supply curve is usually attributed to 'external economies' 
of scale. As market volume increases, the cost to each firm decreases even 
though an individual firm's cost increases with an increase in its own volume 
(volume of other firms held constant). Technically speaking, this is an 
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externality in the cost function of each firm. That is, a firm's costs depend upon 
its own output and the output of all other firms. 
In general, each firm has a cost function of the form Ct (Xi, zj - ? Xj). The cost 
function of firm i depends upon its own output, Xi, and the output of all other 
firms, E. * f X,. The latter is the key externality. 
The theory of competitive behaviour yields an individual supplier's 
behavioural equation of the form 
OC (Xi, q') p = x, ') (I) 
where P = market price 
qi = individual i's expectation about the quantity sold by others; 
i.e., E i Xi. 
Application of the theory of competitive supply yields an individual supply 
function of the form 
Xf= si(P, q') (2) 
The theory of consistent conjectures yields 
qe X, for all i(3) 
J*i 
at equilibrium. 
Together the theory of competitive market supply gives a summation of (2), 
over n firms, and substitution from (3) yields a market supply function 
XS = s(P) . (4) 
The continuous approximations of the actual parameters used in the 
experimental markets will make the model precise. Let aci be parameters 
specific to seller i. By assumption , and y are paranieters common to all sellers. 
The cost function of each firm is given by: 
OA(X, E Xi) 2 Xi 4 X 4 ) (5) 
The data were given to subjects in total cost tables which were evaluations of 
(5) and also in the form of marginal cost tables which were evaluations of 
(*) (I-y ,B ) _ ( ) *( 
axi 1 )Xi 
- 
fi).(6) 
The actual tables seen by subjects are included as an appendix. Of course, each 
subject was informed of only his (her) own parameters. By applying consistent 
conjectures (3) and from (6), individual supply functions are characterised by 
the relation 
Xi = T_ A)C+3P+7 E Xi). (7) 
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Aggregate supply satisfies the relation 
=z>X,= +V\YIZ + x)(8) i i [(-y (a+3+ E )] 8 
which reduces to the supply function where X, is the market supply quantity 
XS= ( I ) (>E ci + Pnfl). (g) 
The objective of having a negatively sloped supply curve places some obvious 
parametric restrictions on (9). In particular we chose 
ax, ax. v = yy so y > I implies p> Vji, 
Under the above assumption the aggregate supply function is of the general 
form 
X ynyP (I O) 8 I-ny I-ny' 
The actual parameters chosen for the supply function were 
n = 6;y = 6;y = ;ca= -63;cb = -6;C = -6. 
The indexes a, b, c, can be recognised as seller 'types'. Each seller of a given 
type had identical cost parameters. For all experiments there were two sellers 
of each given type (e.g. two sellers had parameters OXa, etc.). A graph of this 
continuous approximation is in Fig. I and the actual parameters are in 
Fig. 2 as the curve SS. The equation with a 240 scaling factor for P is 
X, = 38-(I1/20) P. The continuous model is not a particularly good 
approximation for the actual parameters used in the experiment and seen by 
subjects. The actual parameters are contained in the Appendix. 
II. MARKET ORGANISATION 
While the stability notions themselves require no qualifications regarding 
market organisation, much recent experimental work leaves no doubt that 
market organisation is potentially important. The stability ideas themselves 
give hints about the form of organisation that might favour one theory over the 
other. The Walrasian stability concept, for example, would seem to be most 
appropriate when a tatonnement process is used. 
4 This is true for the computerised MUDA of experiment 4 but not for the first three experiments. In the 
single unit oral auction, trading within the final fifteen seconds automatically added thirty seconds to the 
clock. In the single unit case the variable-length period was thought to be necessary to avoid biasing the 
results toward one of the equilibria. If the time period was short, the bias could be in favour of a small volume 
equilibrium. If it was long, a large volume equilibrium might be favoured as individuals trade to avoid 
boredom, attempt to collude, etc. in the extra time. The feature was unnecessary in the MUDA because of 
the speed at which a volume can move. 
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Three different organisations were studied. The first is the double auction. 
In this process buyers tender bids and sellers tender asks publicly. Trading is 
open for a limited period of time4 with a large number of potential bids and asks 
possible. One important feature of this organisation is that market volume; i.e. 
the volume of others, is observed during a period. Participants are able to make 
decisions during a period contingent upon the volume that has already 
occurred in that period. Sellers also know that their own volume will affect the 
costs of others in ways that might induce others to sell more. Thus, from a 
practical point of view, the double auction has potentially important features. 
The second organisation studied was a sealed bid/offer market (see Smith et 
al., i 982). Buyers and sellers each list the prices at which they wish to buy or 
sell each unit. That is, each participant submits a demand or supply function. 
These functions are aggregated in the ordinary way and the equilibrium is 
computed. The last accepted and first excluded demand and supply units 
determine the price. The market price is computed to be midway between the 
minimum of the last accepted bid and first rejected offer and the maximum of 
the last accepted offer and first rejected bid. 
The second organisation is interesting for two reasons. First, because of the 
'excluded price auction' feature, demand revealing aspects exist, though this is 
not to imply that this mechanism is demand revealing.5 Second, a special case 
of the sealed offer institution is that in which suppliers bring a fixed quantity 
to the market that they will sell whatever the price. In any case, suppliers 
cannot make their offers contingent upon the actions of others in these markets 
so one might expect the stability if not the equilibrating properties of this 
process to differ from the double oral auction. 
The third process is the secant tatonnement which is studied for the first time 
in this paper. In this process the experimenter (price adjuster) announces a 
price. Agents respond with quantity offers at that price. If excess demand is 
zero, or if some other stopping rule is involved, the process stops and trade takes 
place at the announcement price. If conditions for stopping are not satisfied, 
then the secant method for finding a new price is used and a new price is 
announced. 
Price changes were determined by the secant formula 
P =p + Pi? ED 
where EDt is the excess demand at t; i.e. it is the sum of amounts demanded 
minus the sum of amounts supplied at Pt. If EDt - EDt- = o then Pt, -Pt= 
Pt- Pt_-. Notice that the process is potentially unstable. If excess demand is 
positive, then prices will increase or if excess demand is negative, prices will 
decrease. This quality is exactly the unstable behaviour that underlies the 
Walrasian concept. 
The process stopped according to two rules: 
(i) If excess demand is zero, then the price change is zero and the process 
stops. 
5 Participants are trading multiple units. Consequently, extramarginal units can have a strategic use. 
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(2) If I (Pt - Pt,) / (EDt - EDt-1) is small enough, then a rounding procedure 
will treat the quantity as zero and the process stops even though excess demand 
is not zero. This latter property can be important in cases of horizontal demand 
or supply curves. The formula and stopping rules were on the chalkboard with 
examples for all to see and study. 
Very little is known about the behaviour of tatonnement processes. 
Operational problems involved with implementing such a process abound. The 
secant process as opposed to a process often referenced in the literature as the 
' proportional adjustment rule' (i.e. X = acED) was chosen as the first to study 
because the natural stopping rules listed above could be applied in the presence 
of discontinuities.6 
III. MODELS 
Two aspects of the economic environment are of interest. The first is the set of 
equilibria and the second is the detail of the dynamic models. The classical 
analysis will be maintained throughout the paper. That is, only the market 
demand and supply functions will be used as the basic parameters of the 
environment. We will indicate those points where we are aware that this 
classical model produces results inconsistent with modern game theory. 
The Walrasian definition is not the same as the Marshallian definition. The 
Walrasian definition has a price to be an equilibrium if the quantity demanded 
at that price equals the quantity supplied at that price. The Marshallian 
definition has a quantity to be in equilibrium if the demand price and supply 
price are equal at that quantity. Both authors also defined equilibria as limit 
points of a dynamic process. This latter distinction is not so important if the 
curves are continuous as they are in Fig. i but special problems occur when the 
curves are discrete as in Fig. 2. 
The literature appears to contain no discussion of problems caused by 
discontinuities so latitude remains to apply these theories in ways that appear 
reasonable. In this paper an equilibrium is either a point that satisfies a static 
definition or it is the limit point of a dynamic process as defined by one of the 
two dynamic theories. 
Table 2 lists the equilibria. The letters correspond to the points as located in 
Fig. 2. Under both demand conditions, D1 and D2, the interior points c, d, e are 
equilibria according to both theories. At the indicated price, quantity 
demanded equals quantity supplied. Some ambiguity can result if the 
Marshallian definition of equilibrium, that demand price equals supply price, 
is used. Strictly speaking, demand price and supply prices are never equal in 
the environment given the discrete curves as drawn. However, the Marshallian 
dynamics would 'push' the system to the Marshallian stable points in the set 
{c, d, e} if the Marshallian model of dynamics is correct. 
The boundary points do not have the symmetry of the interior points. The 
equilibrium properties of these points change according to the demand 
conditions and the theory. 
6 The proportional rule for adjustment has been studied by Patrick Joyce (I984). 
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Table 2 
Equilibria and Stability Properties 
Condition D, Condition D2 
Point Price* Quantity Marshall Walras Marshall Walras 
a 960 o Non eq. Stable Non eq. Stable 
b 630 o Non eq. Non eq. Stable Non eq. 
c 500-540 I 2 Stable Unstable Unstable Stable 
d 380-4 I I 8 Unstable Stable Stable Unstable 
e I40-i80 30 Stablet Unstable Non eq. Non eq. 
f 0 28 Non eq. Non eq. Non eq. Stable 
g 0 30 Non eq. Stable Non eq. Non eq. 
Price reflects conditions D,. Under D2 the range would be narrower. 
t Strictly speaking, this point is not an equilibrium because the demand price at this quantity is 2go and 
is therefore above the supply price which is i 8o. However, quantities on both sides have dynamics that move 
the system in the direction of this quantity according to Marshall. 
In summary, under condition D,, Marshallian theory would predict 
equilibration near points {c, el and Walrasian would predict {a, d, g}. Under 
conditions D2 Marshallian theory would predict points {b, d} while Walrasian 
would predict {c,f}. That point a is a Walrasian equilibrium under condition 
Di is a departure from a game theoretic analysis. At prices that high, some 
producers would be willing to supply units even if others produced zero. Thus 
at prices that high, the support of game theory is lost. 
'We will now turn to the dynamic models. Since the continuous ap- 
proximation of the parameters leads to a piecewise linear model, the analysis 
will be in terms of a linear model. Let the demand equation be 
Xd-ad-bdPd-o (I I) da d bdP O(I) 
and the supply equation be 
X5-a -b P o= o, (I2) 
where Xd and X, are the demand and supply quantities, respectively, and when 
P1 and Ps are the demand price and supply price, respectively. 
The Marshallian theory of dynamics is 
x =Xd = Xs d-X G(Pd-P,)) G"(-) > o. (I 3) dt= 
The Walrasian theory of dynamics is 
P=Ps =P1 dPt F(Xd- Xs) , F (-) > ? oI4 
A problem exists in making these theories operational. The following 
assumptions will be used to facilitate a direct and operational cornparison of the 
two adjustment models. The assumptions are convenient tools for purposes of 
exposition and do not affect the substantive conclusions of the paper. 
Assumption i. The time t refers to an experimental period. 
Assumption 2. = the observed number of transactions in period t. 
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Assumption 3. Xt = X,. That is, the observed number of transactions can be 
interpreted as Xd in the demand equation (i i). 
Assumption 4. Disequilibrium movements lie on the demand curve. This 
means that equation (i i) is always satisfied. 
Assumption 5. The speeds of adjustment functions G(*) and F(*) in (I 3) and 
in (I I4) are linear. That is G(Pd-Ps) = P (P-- P8) and F(Xd-Xs) = /J(Xd-XS) 
Assumptions I to 5 together with (i i) and (I 2) yield the following implications 
of (I 3) and (I 4). The exercise is a context in which the theories can be said to 
be 'opposites'. 
Marshallian Theory: 
dXt X = Marshall(x Xt -ad b Xt ) (15) dt 
Walrasian Theory: 
dp i idXt /JX-[tb (x a.~1,(i6 
t bd dt =bd )( 
dt =flbd 'Walras (X) =/3b4 {Xt - [a.8 bs )]} /1> . (I7) 
Under the assumptions listed above and the maintained hypothesis of the 
theory regarding the market demand and supply, the only unobserved 
variables in (I5) and (I7) are the speed of adjustment parameters X and ,. 
Under the linearity assumption the relationship between the two theories is 
=X --lflb b d (i1 8) dXWalras _Marshall (8 
Since bd bs > o in the downward sloping case and since 8//c > o by the 
maintained hypotheses of the two theories, the two theories give almost 
diametrically opposed predictions. The predicted direction of movement will 
always be the opposite. However, the quantitative relationship can be affected 
by boundaries and by the nonlinearity of the demand function. Nevertheless, 
because the functions are piecewise linear, the relationship (i 8) is true for large 
segments of the price and quantity space. 
Alternative ways of comparing the models exist. The analysis above treated 
quantity as the only observable variable (Assumption 3) and left the price to 
be determined by theory (Assumption 4). Alternatively, the price could have 
been taken to be the only observable variable while allowing quantity to be 
determined by theory, i.e. min {Xd, X}. Since both prices and quantities are 
actually observable, no need exists to impose any such structure for purposes of 
estimation. The two equations in (I 3) can be estimated independently without 
imposing assumptions like (3) or (4z). 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A total of twelve experiments were conducted. Table 3 summarises the 
treatment conditions. The first four experiments were double auctions (DA). 
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Table 3 
Treatment Conditions for All Experiments 
Market 
Experiment Organisation Demand Conditions 
I DOA Di all 6 periods 
2 DOA D1 all Io periods (period I I deleted - had been preceded by 
announcement) 
3 DOA D1 all Io periods (periods II-I2 deleted-had been preceded by 
announcement) 
4 MUDA D1 periods I-9 
Ds all Io periods, D2 periods IO-24 
Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after period I I, reiterate announcement after 
period I3 
5 SBOt D1 periods I-9 
D1 periods IOI-4 
6 SBO$ D1 periods I-9 
D2 periods o-s 5 
7 SBO+ D1i periods I-I4 
D2 periods I5-20 
8 SBO D1 periods I-14 
D2 periods I5-24 
Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after period 20 
9 Tatonnement D1 periods I-9 
D2 periods II-13 
I0 Tatonnement D1 periods I-9 
D2 periods IOI 2 
II Tatonnement D1 periods I-9 
D2 periods IO-I5 
Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after periods I I and I2 
I2 Tatonnement D1 periods I-9 
D2 periods Io-I9 
Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after periods I I and I 2 
t Public information at the end of a period included the highest bid, lowest bid, lowest accepted bid, and 
highest accepted ask, price, and volume. 
$ The highest rejected bid and lowest rejected ask were announced along with the information described 
in footnote t. 
The first three of these four were conducted under constant demand conditions 
as single unit double oral auctions (DOA). The DOA process required more 
time than was anticipated. In addition the system was not equilibrating as 
anticipated so a decision was made to keep demand constant. Since the 
multiple unit double auction (MUDA) used in experiment 4 is faster,7 a 
demand shift was implemented in that market. 
Experiments 5, 6, 7 and 8 were conducted as sealed bid offer (SBO) auctions. 
For these, because of the speed of the market, we were able to implement the 
shifting demand design as planned. 
Experiments 9, i o, i i, and I2 were all secant tatonnement. Demand was 
held at D1 for the first nine periods and was shifted to D2 beginning the tenth 
period. Demand condition D2 was maintained for two to four periods after 
which the experiment terminated or an experimenter intervention occurred as 
explained below. 
7 The MUDA was computerised. The program can be found in Plott (i99i). 
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Fig. 3. All contracts from experiment 3, double oral auction. 
In some experiments an experimenter intervention occurred in the form of 
a public announcement that demonstrated8 the existence of an equilibrium 
(Marshallian stable and Walrasian unstable) at P* = 400, X*I = 8. These 
interventions came at times after the primary objectives of the research had 
already been completed and an opportunity existed to explore secondary 
objectives at a very low marginal cost. The intervention represented an 
exploratory check to see if the market would stay at a Marshallian stable 
(Walrasian unstable) point if the market was 'placed' there. The data from 
these interventions were not used in the analysis but are reproduced for the 
interested reader. 
V. RESULTS 
Figs. 3, 4 and 5 contain an example of a time series from each of the three 
different types of market organisation. Table 4 contains the average price and 
volume for all periods of all experiments. The table indicates when the shift 
from D1 to D2 occurred and when information about equilibria was announced. 
In the first four experiments under the double auction processes, prices vary 
within a period so the average price does not contain all of the information. In 
all other experiments all transactions took place at the same price. 
The first conclusion and remark address the general question of equilibration 
8 Each seller received a slip of paper that contained a statement and question of the form 'Assume the 
volume of others was __'. Subjects were then asked to reveal the amount they would supply or demand 
at a price of $400. The responses were public so the consistency of the responses with the slip revealed the 
equilibrium to all. The volume of others would be as expected and demand and supply would be equal. In 
experiments (8, period 2 I), (i i, periods I 2, I3), (I 2, periods I 2, I 3) the announcement and responses were 
actually counted as periods. 
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Table 4 
Volume and Average Price for All Periods of All Experiments 
Experiment Period Vol. Av. Price Experiment Period Vol. Av. Price 
I DA* I I3 602-3 5 SB/O+ I 13 440.0 
2 I I 549 4 2 I3 440-0 
3 8 5645 3 I0 5000 
4 4 622-5 4 II 6ooo- 
5 4 639-8 5 II 6oo-o 
6 7 627-9 6 IO 6ioo- 
2 DA I I0o 558-o 7 Io 6g-o 
2 I 2 562-9 8 I0 599 o 
3 9 569 4 9 IO 599 0 
4 I2 56i12 Treatment Change 
5 I2 556 7 tA-_ -___ __ ___ __ 
6 I2 553 3 Io 7 56o-o 
7 I I 553 6 I I 6 585-0 
8 I2 553 8 I2 4 5940 
9 I3 539 5 I3 3 6oo-o IO I 2 54I-6 I4 I 6oo-o 
3 DA I IO 5I3 0 6 SB/O I 6 6oo-o 
2 I0 6I2-5 2 I2 525y0 
3 8 65o0o 3 I 2 500 0 
4 20 5I9 2 4 I2 5000 
5 12 578-8 5 1 2 500 0 
6 I 2 572-5 6 I2 5000 
7 12 552 9 7 I I 503-0 
8 Io 565-o 8 I I 530-0 
9 IO 570-0 9 II 545 0 
10 9 564.4 Treatment Change 
4 MUDAt I 8 627-5 A_. . _ _ 
2 8 632-3 
3 6 63I-7 IO 7 533 0 
4 6 633-7 I I 7 538-o 5 8 648-9 I2 7 550-0 
6 7 646-6 I3 5 5750 
7 7 649-o I4 3 5910 
8 7 653- I I 5 4 580-o 
9 8 659-0 7 SB/O I 8 512-0 
Treatment Change 2 II 5340 
A___________________ 3 I I 577 0 
4 9 602-o 
IO 0 5 I 2 98-o 
I I 0 6 I2 583-0 
Treatment Change 7 12 572.0 
A_ 8 12 565-o 
I2 I9 456-I 9 I I 599-0 
I3 I 4500 10 1 2 59I-0 
I I 12 7820o 
Treatment Change I2 I2 55520 
rA5 I3 I2 6o0-o 
14 20 403'9 I4 12 56o-o 
I5 I7 4194 Treatment Change i6 I4 438-9 A 
I7 IO 4555 
i8 7 467-I I5 8 530-0 
I9 4 500-0 I 6 8 554 0 
20 6 4501 o 7 6 575 0 
2I I8 46I-I I8 3 595 0 
22 I8 452-6 I9 I 6ioo- 
23 I5 4647 20 0 
24 I7 472 3 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Experiment Period Vol. Av. Price Experiment Period Vol. Av. Price 
8 SB/O I IO 475 0 8 5 622-0 
2 I I 500 0 9 5 635-o 
3 II 5000 Treatment Change 
4 7 550-0 
A_ 
5 8 599-0 IO I 630-0 6 9 630-0 I I I 602-0 7 IO 629-0 I2 0 63I-0 8 I0 6ITO12 0 60 
9 IO 6oo-o I I T I 8 633-o 
IO I0 620-o 2 9 6I5-o 
II IO 622-0 3 IO 632-0 
12 9 6I1-3 4 IO 607-0 
I3 Io 623-0 5 Io 6o8-o 
I4 10 6I9-o 6 Io 605-o 
Treatment Change 7 9 602-0 8 Io 60g-o 
9 I I 6oo-o 
I5 6 559O Treatment Change i6 5 590-0 
I7 3 6oo-o  o 
I8 2 6I5O IO 2 6I9-o 
Ig I 629-0 I I 0 602-o 
20 0 Treatment Change 
Treatment Change r A 
A 
-- ~ - ^ + I 2 i8 400 0 
21 I8 4000 13 I8 400 0 
22 I5 500 0 I4 I7 37IP0 
23 I I 5II-0 I5 i8 386-o 
24 9 530-0 I 2 T I I2 567-0 
g T? I 8 546-o 2 I0 592 0 
2 IO 577 0 3 I I 58I0 
3 9 568-o 4 9 584.0 
4 I0 578-o 5 I0 590-0 
5 IO 583-0 6 II 598-o 
6 I2 579 0 7 Io 6I7-0 
7 10 580-o 8 II 590-0 
8 II 5730 9 IO 5900 
9 10 583.0 Treatment Change 
Treatment Change rA_ _ _ 
A 
5 Io0 7 582-0 
IO 3 5720 I 0 6I5-0 
II 3 567.0 Treatment Change 
I 2 I 59 I10 
I3 3 564-0 12 I 8 400-0 ioT I I2 4540 I3 I8 4000 
2 I2 528-o I4 I3 435 0 
3 6 6450o I 5 6 54I0O 
4 8 605-o I 6 3 586-o 
5 9 5710 1 7 2 6oo-o 
6 9 6I4-0 I8 0 63I-0 
7 6 626-o I 9 6 552-0 
* Double auction. 
t Multiple unit double auction. 
+ Sealed bid/offer. 
? Tatonnement. 
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in such a complicated environment. The conclusion is important because the 
degree to which the secant tatonnement process would settle on any price at all 
was completely unknown. The remark that follows the conclusion is important 
because the model of the market supply function is based on behavioural 
principles that are not used in models of supply that traditionally have been 
studied in experimental markets. 
Conclusion i. The (secant) tatonnement process operated to determine a 
market price. 
The tatonnement process employed in experiments 9, Io, i i, and I 2 always 
terminated according to the rules. A market price and corresponding exchanges 
were always established. 
Remark i. The demand and supply model is not as accurate in the 
downward sloping supply case as it has been in other studies involving upward 
sloping supply functions. 
In order to understand the remark, study the final periods of D1 for 
experiments I, 4 and Io. In these markets volume is about midway between 
two equilibria and the prices are off by 20% or more. Usually, under the 
double auction or under the sealed bid offer, the accuracy of the price 
predictions of the competitive model falls within 5 0 or so. The problem is seen 
again in the volume predictions. In all but two experiments volume was below 
predictions in the last period of D1 and it was never above. Thus the errors of 
the model are systematic and occasionally large.9 This phenomena is present 
under all three institutions. 
Conclusion 2. For all experiments under conditions D1 before the demand 
shift, prices and volume converge nearer to point c than to any other 
equilibrium. This point is Marshallian stable and Walrasian unstable. 
Again observe the data in the last period of condition D1. For all experiments 
the stable Marshallian equilibrium nearest the data is point c and the nearest 
Walrasian stable equilibrium is point a. All but five of the twenty-four data are 
closer to c than to a. The exceptions are prices in experiments i, 8, Io, and I3 
and volume in experiment io. On average, the price predictions of the (stable) 
Marshallian model has a I4 % of price and a 3 unit volume error. By contrast 
the (stable) Walrasian model exhibits price predictions that are on average off 
by 20%0 and volume predictions that are off by 9-6 units. The equilibria of the 
Marshallian stable model are better predictors of the data. 
Conclusion 3. For all experiments under conditions D2 after the demand 
shift, the data are nearer point b than to any other equilibrium. This point is 
Marshallian stable and Walrasian unstable. 
Consider the final period of condition 2 before any announcements are made 
about the locations of equilibria. The data are closer to the stable Marshallian 
equilibrium b than to the stable Walrasian equilibrium c in seventeen of the 
eighteen cases. The exception is the price data in experiment 9. On average the 
9 A referee conjectures that this phenomena might be sensitive to the magnitude of' excess demand' in the 
neighbourhood of the equilibria. The conjecture is that a wider 'diamond' between D1 and D2 would 
facilitate tighter convergence to the Marshallian stable equilibrium. 
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price predictions in the stable Marshallian model are off by 30010 and the 
quantity predictions are off by o 9 units. By contrast the price predictions of the 
stable Walrasian are off by 20 ?on average and the volume predictions are off 
by I I units on average. 
The Marshallian and Walrasian models are fundamentally theories of 
dynamics rather than theories of equilibria. Comparison of equilibria does not 
explore the nature of price movements and thus does not get to the essence of 
the difference in approach. In order to give a direct test of the two models, 
discrete variations of (I5) and (I 7) were used. Specifically, the estimated 
models were 
AX= Xt+?-Xt = ak+bk/f k(XA) +Ckt, 
Xt = observed market volume in period t 
k E {Marshall, Walras}, (I 9) 
~fMarshall(Xt) (Pd Ps)Ixt) (20) 
frWalras (Xt) (Xd Xs)IXt. (2I) 
The values of fMarsha11(Xt) are observable without additional theory of the 
adjustment process. So the econometric measurements can be made directly 
without additional maintained hypotheses. The value of fWalras (Xe) can be 
observed as a result of assumptions (i) through (5) as was demonstrated in 
equation (07).11 
The magnitudes can be estimated by application of equation (i9). Both 
dynamic theories predict 
ak=o bk > o. 
However, by virtue of the experimental design, it is unlikely to observe bk > 0 
for both values of k since over wide ranges of the variables the models differ 
only by a negative constant of proportionality. However, the models are 
estimated separately because differences can occur in certain areas of the 
observation space because of the nonlinearities. The models were estimated 
over several restricted data sets. First all of the data prior to announcements 
were used. Then the models were checked using only first period data. The 
models were also estimated with the inclusion of data after announcements. 
These perturbations of the data resulted in no changes in the conclusions. The 
estimates in Table 5 are those for the data before any parameter announcements 
were made. Since the announcements were not implemented sufficiently 
systematically to be considered as treatment variables for purposes of statistical 
analysis, the data after announcements were not used to obtain the regression 
results reported in Table 5. 
10 These figures assume that the prices are at the Marshallian equilibrium when zero quantity and no 
prices are observed. This makes the Marshallian model look better but does not change conclusions. In a 
process like tatonnement, prices are observed without trade. 
" Since market prices are observable, other tests not involving these assumptions could be devised. In 
particular, mean price changes could be used as the dependent variable for the Walras model. However, the 
direct comparison of models would be lost. 
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Table 5 
Estimated CoefJicients, -statistic, Durbin-Watson Statistic, and Adjusted R2. 
AX= a+blIk 
Vf measured by Marshall 
N a b DW R 
Double Auction 48 - i164 0-038 2-03 0?459 
(-2-33) (5-62) 
Sealed bid/offer 69 -O-I98 0o03I P* = 0-243 o-651 
(-0?73) (III2) 
Titonnement 47 - IV20 0-034 P* = 0-233 0-528 
(-2-24) (7-48) 
Vb measured by Walras 
N a b DW R 
Double Auction 48 o-623 - I-62 21I4 -0027 
(o0677) (-2-64) 
Sealed bid/offer 69 -O-I98 - I2-37 P* = 0243 o-65I 
(-0-73) (-II'12) 
Tatonnement 47 -0O103 -4.36 P754 0?004 
( - O- I73) I - 1*05) 
* An AR(I) was run to correct for autocorrelation. 
Conclusion 4. The Walrasian model can be rejected in favour of the 
Marshallian model in all three organisations. 
In Table 5 the estimate of adjustment term, b, is positive and significant 
under the Marshallian model. Contrary to the predictions of the Walrasian 
model, the b is always negative and significant except in the tatonnement where 
it is not significant. Adjusted R2 are never worse under the Marshallian model. 
The size of the estimated coefficient, b, seems small under the Marshallian 
adjustment theory but in reality the size is simply a result of the units involved 
in the independent variable, 1fiMarshala(XA). A change of units would change the 
slope without affecting the intercept. 
The support for the Marshallian model is not all positive. Both theories 
predict that the intercept term will be zero. As shown in Table 5, dk is 
significantly negative for two of the three processes according to the Marshallian 
model. However, the magnitudes are small. We conjecture that they result 
from nonlinearities in the adjustment process or perhaps from the fact that the 
markets tended to equilibrate with volumes less than the equilibrium. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explored the two classic theories of stability found in the literature. 
Several new experimental issues were involved with the study. Downward 
sloping supplies had never been studied under any circumstances. The forward 
falling case rests on the existence of an externality 4nd the theory of market 
supply requires a consistent conjectures component. Consequently even 
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equilibration itself was in need of study. Classical discussions of stability seem 
to presuppose the existence of a tatonnement process so in order to facilitate the 
study within that type of organisation, a special type of (secant) tatonnement 
was designed and implemented. The stylised results are as follows. 
i. The law of supply and demand works with reasonable accuracy in the 
case of forward falling supply. Even though the data fall substantially short of 
strong support for the model (see Remark i), the degree of success of the model 
is surprising because the supply model involved a rational expectations 
component that has not been present in other studies. 
2. The (secant) tatonnement process reliably equilibrated the markets. The 
data reported here involve the first investigation of the operation of this class 
of processes. 
3. The dynamics of market equilibration suggest that stability is a property 
of equilibria. Shifts in the demand which cause an equilibrium to become 
unstable are followed by movement away from the equilibrium. Whether or 
not equilibration at an unstable point can actually be observed occurring in a 
market remains an open question. 
4. The Marshallian stability model captures the observed phenomena and 
the Walrasian model does not. Between the two models the Marshallian is the 
appropriate one for the forward falling supply case. 
5. The conclusions above are independent of market organisation. The 
Marshallian model is the appropriate model even when the market is organised 
by tatonnement. 
The most important question has not been answered. Does the Marshallian 
model have a firm foundation in modern theory? Or, was it an accident 
resulting from a choice of parameters and procedures that made the 
Marshallian model look good? Will the result hold up in the backward bending 
supply case? The prospect was advanced years ago that the two conditions of 
supply, forward falling and backward bending, might be characterised by 
different stability properties.12 
For some reason the Marshallian concept of stability has almost been 
dropped from consideration by the profession. Only the Walrasian model 
appears in textbooks as a suggestion for applications. While it is much too early 
to claim that the practice is wrong, these data suggest that unanswered 
questions exist about the circumstances under which these competing concepts 
might be used reliably. 
California Institute of Technology 
Date of receipt of final typescript: August i9i 
12 I am indebted to Eskander Alvi for calling to my attention Kahn (I933). 
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APPENDIX 
Instructional Material and Parameters 
Buyers were given standard instructions such as those found in Plott (I989). 
The only differences are the numbers used in the examples. Seller instructions 
are special because of the nature of the externality. These are reproduced in this 
appendix. A quiz and a period zero were both administered to check subjects' 
understanding of the accounting system. The Cost Sheet contains the parameters 
of sellers. These are important because slight adjustments from the continuous 
model were made in order to obtain the quantified incentives used in the 
experiment. In addition to a sheet with marginal cost information, sellers were 
given sheets with total costs. 
Specific Instructions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to sell as many units as you might be 
able to. The profit from each sale (which is yours to keep) is computed by 
taking the difference between the price at which you sold the unit and the cost 
of the unit. Note that you may sell a unit at a price below the cost of the unit. 
Therefore 
[your profit = (sale price) - (cost)]. 
Your cost depends upon your volume and the volume of others. This 
means that when you sell units you will not know your costs with certainty. 
Your costs will be known only at the end of a period when the total volume of 
sales is known. Examine your Cost Sheet. If the volume of others is zero, that 
is, you were the only one who sold units, then the cost of each of your units is 
found in the column labelled o. If the volume of others is 23 then the cost of 
each of your units is found in the column labelled 23. 
Suppose, for example, that you sold two units in-a market in which a total 
of ten units were sold. Find the appropriate column in your Example Cost Sheet 
(as illustrated on the chalkboard). Since the volume of others is 8 units, the 
cost to you of the first unit is I,5oo and the cost of the second unit is 2,000. If 
you sold each unit for 3,500, your profit is: 
Profit from first unit = 3500- I500 = 2000, 
Profit from second unit = 3500- 2000 = I500, 
Total Profit = 2000+ I500 = 3500. 
The blanks on the Record Sheet will help you record your profit. The sale price 
of the first unit you sell during the first period should be recorded in row (i). 
The same should be done (in the appropriate rows) for any additional units 
sold in this period. At the end of the period, enter the market volume of the 
period in row (A), enter your volume in row (B) and subtract row (B) from 
row (A) to determine the resulting volume of others which is entered in row 
(C). Then look on your Cost Sheet to find your unit costs. On the Record Sheet 
enter the cost of the first unit in row (2). You should then record the profit on 
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1000 
970 
940 
860 
830 
800 
770 
740 
660 
630 
600 
570 
540 
460 
430 
400 
370 
340 
260 
20 
200 
170 
14 
0 
3 
0 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
5th 
UNIT 
1140 
1110 
1090 
1050 
1020 
940 
910 
880 
850 
820 
740 
710 
680 
650 
620 
540 
510 
480 
450 
420 
340 
310 
280 
250 
220 
140 
110 
80 
50 
20 
2b 
20 
20 
6th 
UNIT 
1220 
1190 
1160 
1130 
1100 
1020 
990 
960 
930 
900 
820 
790 
760 
730 
700 
620 
590 
560 
530 
500 
420 
390 
360 
330 
300 
220 
190 
160 
130 
100 
20 
20 
20 
7th 
UNIT 
1300 
1270 
1240 
1210 
1180 
1100 
1070 
1040 
1010 
980 
900 
870 
840 
810 
780 
700 
1670 
640 
610 
580I 
500 
4701 
440 
410 
380 
300 
270 
240 
210 
180 
100 
70 
40 
SthtUNIT 
1380 
1350. 
1320 
1290, 
1260 
1180 
1150 
1120 
1090 
1060 
980 
950 
920 
890 
860 
780 
750 
720 
690 
660 
580 
550 
520 
490 
460 
380 
350 
320 
290 
260 
180 
150 
1230 
ist 
UNIT 
800 
770 
740 
660 
630 
600 
570 
540 
460 
430 
400 
370 
340 
260 
230 
200 
170 
140 
60 
30 
20 
201 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Ztd 
UNIT 
880 
850 
820 
740 
710 
680 
650 
620' 
540 
510 
480 
450 
420 
340 
310 
280 
250 
220 
140 
110 
I80 
50 
20 
30 
20, 
20 
30D 
20, 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
3ttIUNIT 
960 
930 
900 
820 
790 
760 
730 
700 
620 
590 
560 
530 
500 
420 
380 
360 
330 
300 
220 
190 
160 
130 
100 
30 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
4th 
UNIT 
1040 
1010 
980 
900 
870 
840 
810 
780 
700 
670 
640 
610 
580 
500 
470 
440 
410 
380 
300 
270 
240 
210 
180 
100 
70 
40 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
30 
5th 
UNIT 
1120 
1090 
1060 
980 
950 
920 
890 
860 
780 
750 
720 
690 
660 
580 
550 
520 
490 
460 
380 
350 
320 
290 
260 
180 
ISO 
120 
90 
60 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
6th 
UNIT 
1200 
1170 
1140 
1060 
1030 
1000 
970 
940 
860 
830 
8300 
770 
740 
660 
630 
600 
570 
540 
460 
430 
400 
370 
340 
260 
230 
200 
170 
140 
60 
30 
20 
20 
20 
7th 
UNIT 
1280 
1250 
1220 
1140 
1110 
1080 
IOSO 
1020 
940 
910 
880 
850 
820 
70 
710 
680 
650 
620 
540 
SIO 
480 
450 
420 
340 
310 
280 
250 
220 
140 
110 
80 
50 
20 
8th 
UNIT 
1360 
1330 
1300 
1220 
1190 
1160 
1130 
1100 
1020 
990 
960 
930] 
900 
820 
790 
760 
730 
700 
620 
590 
560 
530 
500 
430 
380 
360 
330 
300 
220 
190 
160 
130 
100 
Scheme 
i. 
Cost 
sheet 
(Type 
a, 
b, 
c, 
respectively) 
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this sale as directed in row (3). After computing the profit for each unit sold, 
record the total profit for that period in the last row on the page, row (4'). 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly in the appropriate column 
(period I in column (i); period 2 in column (2); etc.). 
Record sheet 
Unit Trading period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
sold number 
A Market volume 
B Own volume 
C Volume of others (row A-row B) 
1 1 Selling price 
2 Cost of first unit 
Profit 3 (row 1-row 2) 
4 
2 5 Selling price 
6 Cost of second unit 
-ro fi t 7 (row 5-row 6) 
gI_ 
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